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Chapter 9
Robustness to Malware Reinfections
In Chap. 8, we analyzed a deterministic epidemiological model where an infected
node immediately contaminated all its neighbors of the same type. The spreading
process was completely determined by the spreading network’s topology, the config-
uration of node types, and the selection of initially infected nodes or seeds. Because
no node recovered from an infection, there were no long-term dynamics. The spread-
ing simply stopped when all reachable nodes were infected. Here, we study a sto-
chastic epidemiological model of multimalware outbreaks where arbitrary but fixed
probabilities determine whether nodes are infected. Furthermore, nodes recover from
infections with given probabilities, only to be reinfected later. An incident from 2007,
where the same worm repeatedly infected the internal networks of a Norwegian bank,
illustrates how reinfections can occur in real networks.
The stochastic epidemiological model is first used to determine how to immunize
unknown hubs on diverse inhomogeneous spreading networks. A simple solution
is obtained by generalizing the acquaintance immunization strategy for monocul-
ture networks [25]. Next, the model is analyzed to determine the software diversity
required to halt multimalware spreading in homogeneous spreading networks where
nodes can be infected multiple times by the same malware. The analysis produces
a lower bound on the diversity needed to ensure that, with a high probability, the
malware outbreaks do not spread far but, instead, die out quickly. The lower bound
is obtained by modifying a “classical” result from network science [87]. A reader
unfamiliar with differential equations can skip the development of the bound, since
it is not needed to understand the remaining chapters.
9.1 Malware Attack on a Norwegian Bank
In March 2007, Viking.gt, a worm well known to anti-malware software vendors at
the time, attacked office computers belonging to a large bank in Norway. The worm,
most likely residing on an external game site, entered the bank’s internal networks
via a computer at a branch office and cascaded across roughly 1,000 servers and
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11,000 office PCs in 190 branch offices. This cascade failure occurred because the
anti-malware software running on the bank’s computers did not stop infections, even
though the anti-malware software was updated with an appropriate signature for the
worm. During the attack, branch offices could not assist their customers with many
tasks and some offices closed.
About 200 individuals worked two shifts to remove the worm. Because the
worm disabled the machines’ automatic software update mechanism, the worm had
to be manually removed from each machine. The vendor’s initial upgrade to the
anti-malware software was flawed, allowing infected machines to reinfect cleaned
machines over internal networks. The bank decided to close all connections to the
Internet to protect their internal systems from further external infection. It then took
days to remove the malware from the internal networks.
The next section presents a malware spreading model that allows malware to rein-
fect nodes. This stochastic model is a generalization of the deterministic explanatory
model in Chap. 8.
9.2 Stochastic Epidemiological Model
Let a networked computer system be infected by different types of malware. The
malware’s spreading network is modeled as an undirected graph with M edges and
N nodes of different types. The node types represent machines with distinct software
at the operating system or application layer and the edges represent virtual commu-
nication lines. There is at most one edge between two nodes and no edge connects a
node to itself. If there is an edge between two nodes, then these nodes are neighbors.
The degree k of a node is the number of neighbors. The nodes’ average degree is
〈k〉 = (2M)/N .
As noted in Chap. 8, the topology of the spreading network depends on the soft-
ware layer and the vulnerabilities exploited to spread the malware. We discriminate
between an inhomogeneous network containing a few nodes, the hubs, with a very
large degree k  〈k〉 and a homogeneous network where all nodes have a degree
k ≈ 〈k〉. Any spreading network has L different node types l = 1, 2, . . . , L for
1 ≤ L  N . Each node type occurs Nl times. A node chosen uniformly at random
is of type l with probability Nl/N for N = ∑l Nl . When Nl = N/L , the diversity is
equal to the number of node types L with the convention that a monoculture network
with only one type has no diversity [50].
A node of arbitrary type l is either susceptible to an infection or it is infected. If
an infection is removed from the node, then it immediately becomes susceptible to a
new infection. There are L types of malware, where each type of malware infects a
particular software platform, that is, node type. Because there are L nodes types with
L corresponding malware types, the complete spreading network can be viewed as
L disjoint subnet monocultures, each containing a single node type.
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Multiple simultaneous malware epidemics are modeled by L susceptible–
infected–susceptible (SIS) models [23, 87] operating on the same network topology
but affecting L disjoint subnet monocultures. Initially, all the nodes are susceptible.
At time step t = 0, the model selects uniformly at random S (≥1) nodes of each type
l and infects them. These L · S initially infected nodes are the seeds. For each time
step t = 1, 2, 3, . . ., any infected node of type l infects any susceptible neighbor of
type l with infection probability pl , 0 < pl ≤ 1. At the same time, any infected node
of type l recovers with recovery probability ql , 0 ≤ ql ≤ 1.
If ql > 0 for some l, then a node can repeat the SIS life cycle many times. The
result is a stochastic model with long-term dynamics, where it is assumed that the
infections and recoveries are updated in a random asynchronous order. When pl = 1
and ql = 0 for all l, the SIS models become L susceptible–infected (SI) models.
The overall spreading model is deterministic in this case, since malware infects
all reachable nodes with 100 % probability. Consequently, the spreading process is
completely determined by the network’s topology, the configuration of node types,
and the selection of seeds. Because no node recovers from an infection, there are
no long-term dynamics. The spreading simply stops when all reachable nodes are
infected. This special case of L deterministic SI models was first presented in Chap. 8
for Nl = N/L .
9.3 How to Immunize Unknown Hubs
While we may not know the degrees of many nodes in inhomogeneous spreading
networks, it is still possible to immunize hubs in advance of malware outbreaks. The
acquaintance immunization strategy [25] provides an elegant solution to the prob-
lem of immunizing unknown hubs in a monoculture (L = 1): Choose a set of nodes
uniformly at random and immunize one arbitrary neighbor per node. While the orig-
inal set of nodes is unlikely to contain the relatively few hubs in an inhomogeneous
network, the randomly selected neighbors are much more likely to be hubs, since
many edges are adjacent to high-degree nodes.
We can generalize acquaintance immunization to diverse networks. Assume that
it is possible to estimate the number of nodes Nl of each type l in a diverse network,
perhaps by estimating the total size of the network and then determining the per-
centages of different node types in a small part of the network. For some fraction
0 < f < 1, choose a set of f · Nl nodes of type l uniformly at random such that each
node has at least one neighbor of the same type, l = 1, 2, . . . , L . Immunize one ran-
domly selected neighbor of type l per node in the set. When the number of immunized
neighbors f · Nl of each type l is large enough, most hubs are immunized [25].
To illustrate acquaintance immunization on diverse spreading networks, we con-
sider an inhomogeneous network with dominant hubs. The network has 10,670 nodes
and 22,002 edges. The largest hub has degree 2,312, which is nearly 11 % of the total
number of edges. The L = 7 node types have different colors and the size of a
node is proportional to its degree; that is, hubs are larger than low-degree nodes.
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Fig. 9.1 Acquaintance
immunization of a network
with enlarged hubs at the
top. Only immunized nodes
and susceptible hubs are
shown. Note that most hubs
are immunized
A node turns pink when it is immunized. Let the fraction of immunized neighbors be
f = 0.04 (4 %). Figure 9.1 shows only the immunized pink nodes and the remaining
susceptible multicolored hubs after acquaintance immunization. No edges or sus-
ceptible low-degree nodes are shown. Note that most of the 216 enlarged hubs are
immunized. Assume S = 20 seeds per node type for a total of 7 ·20 = 140 seeds. Let
pl = 0.06 and ql = 0.04. When acquaintance immunization is performed in advance,
the fraction of infected nodes goes to zero after only a few hundred time steps.
9.4 Lower Bound on Required Diversity
In this section we determine a lower bound on the node diversity L needed to make it
very likely that new malware outbreaks will die out before they spread to many nodes.
We assume that all hubs are immunized, even though acquaintance immunization
may miss a few. Because the hubs and their adjacent edges do not partake in the
transmission of malware, we model the spreading network after hub immunization
as a random homogeneous network with N nodes, average degree z = 〈k〉, and
Nl = N/L nodes of each type, l = 1, 2, . . . , L . The spreading network has a
fixed but arbitrary (thin-tailed) degree distribution. Note that modeling the remaining
spreading network after hub immunization as a random network is an approximation
chosen because random networks are malleable to analysis [23].
The average fraction of infected nodes of type l, denoted hl , is estimated by
considering the subset of N/L nodes of type l. To estimate hl , we extend an analytical
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technique for random networks viewed as homogeneous monocultures (L = 1) [23,
87]. Each malware outbreak in a network with L > 1 node types operates on a
subgraph with N/L nodes of the same type. On average, a node has z/L neighbors
in the subgraph because the probability that a node is of type l is Nl/N = 1/L .
Let the spreading rate be ρl = (pl z)/(ql L) for ql > 0, l = 1, 2, . . . , L , and view
hl = hl(t) as a continuous-time variable. Representing the expected change in the
fraction of infected nodes as the differential equation
dhl
dt
= pl zL hl(1 − hl) − qlhl
and imposing the stationary condition dhl/dt = 0, we find that the average fraction
of infected nodes saturates at hl = 1 − 1/ρl for ρl > 1. The fraction hl goes to zero
in finite time when ρl < 1. For a fixed infection probability pl , recovery probability
ql , and average degree z, the spreading rate ρl = (pl z)/(ql L) < 1 when the number
of node types L > (pl z)/ql . Consequently, hl goes to zero.
Since we need hl to go to zero for all l, the needed node diversity is lower
bounded by







where z = 〈k〉 is the average node degree of the remaining spreading network after
hub immunization. The largest spreading rate essentially determines the required
diversity L .
It is possible to estimate the lower bound in inequality (9.1) for real malware
types by estimating the infection probabilities pl and recovery probabilities ql . How-
ever, the inequality is first and foremost important because it shows that multiple
simultaneous malware outbreaks with the ability to reinfect nodes will die out before
they can spread far when the software diversity is large enough, given that hubs are
immunized.
9.5 Discussion and Summary
A combination of acquaintance immunization and node diversity prevents malware
with the ability to reinfect nodes from creating long-lasting epidemics. Through
immunization of most of the hubs and a sufficient increase in node diversity, malware
outbreaks are likely to die out quickly. Hence, acquaintance immunization and node
diversity together provide robustness to malware reinfection.
As first stated in Sect. 8.7, graph coloring algorithms can be used to ensure that no
(or very few) pairs of neighboring nodes have the same color or node type. Coloring
algorithms exploit the topology of static spreading networks to reduce the number of
node types needed to prevent malware propagation, compared to our simple approach
of just randomly assigning node types. Why, then, are we using this simple approach
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in both the previous and current chapters when it does not minimize the number of
different colors needed to prevent malware spreading? There are two main reasons.
First, while coloring algorithms need central processing to assign node types,
our simple scheme requires no central control. We cannot use algorithms requiring
central control to assign node types because of their limited scalability. Our goal is
a malware-halting technique that scales to millions of nodes. Second, the topologies
of the malware spreading networks are not known and, even if they were, networks
will vary over time, making it necessary to constantly rerun the coloring algorithms
to reassign node types. Hence, we do not let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
Instead of trying to come up with sophisticated solutions to make highly complex
networks more or less immune to malware spreading, we fight complexity with sim-
plicity [88]. The next chapter suggests and analyzes a simple scalable technique
providing anti-fragility to malware with unknown and changing spreading patterns.
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